A European Security Architecture Without American Umbrella

The European security architecture is facing a potential rebirth. Let's consider a scenario where the United States significantly reduces its role within NATO over the next ten years – for example, by strategically focusing on Asia or adopting isolationist policies. In this case, Europe must reassess its own security. Can the fragmentation of regional security initiatives be prevented? And to what extent do European countries, particularly the Netherlands, take matters into their own hands through defense cooperation? This research analyzes these questions quantitatively and strategically. We examine not only defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP but also hard indicators such as industrial production capacity, available equipment, and troop numbers. We map the balance of power with numbers and discuss the impact on the European defense industry. In doing so, we incorporate diverse perspectives – from Chinese and Russian to European and other non-Western views – to objectively highlight the interests and choices of key players (Germany, France, Netherlands). Finally, we outline different future scenarios and assess the opportunities and risks for Dutch foreign and defense policy for each scenario.

Key takeaways

• European Security at a Crossroads: The next decade is critical for European security as a potential U.S. retreat shifts responsibility to Europe, requiring greater unity, resource pooling, and investment in defense capabilities.
• Fragmentation Risks: Divergent regional priorities—Eastern Europe focusing on Russia and Southern Europe on North Africa and migration—threaten to fragment European security efforts, undermining collective defense.
• Dutch Dependence on Stability: As a small, trade-dependent nation, the Netherlands relies on a stable and secure international environment, making cohesive European cooperation essential to safeguard its economic and security interests.
• Dutch Defense Strategy: The Netherlands therefore, should advocate for trans-Atlantic cohesion while strengthening European defense, guided by the principle of "NATO where possible, EU where necessary," to navigate future uncertainties effectively.
• Netherlands as a Bridge-Builder: The Netherlands can play a pivotal role in fostering unity by acting as a connector between the EU and NATO, Eastern and Western Europe, and large and small states.

A changing security architecture in Europe

In the decades following the Cold War, European countries heavily relied on the American security umbrella within NATO. The US acted as the largest military power, "guarantor of last resort," and provider of crucial capabilities such as nuclear deterrence, intelligence, and logistics. An American withdrawal – or significantly reduced role – would therefore be a shock to the established order. French leaders had already warned against European dependence; President Macron called NATO "brain dead" in 2019 to criticize the lack of strategic direction without active US involvement (Macron was criticized by the US and Germany over NATO 'brain death' claims | The Guardian). The question now arises: Can Europe take care of its own defense? From Brussels, there is a call for "strategic autonomy" – the ability to act independently in security matters. This means that the EU would take on a more active defense role, parallel to or even within the NATO structure. At the same time, there is a risk of fragmentation as member states pursue their own paths. Without the unifying pressure from Washington, regional differences in threat perception could be exaggerated. Eastern European countries (such as Poland and the Baltic states) are highly concerned about the Russian threat, while southern member states are more focused on instability in North Africa, the Middle East, and migration flows. If there is no unified European security policy, such divergent priorities could weaken collective defense.

The Dutch government approaches this dynamic with serious attention. As a small country with an open economy, the Netherlands is dependent on stable international relations and alliance certainty. Fragmentation of European security could be an undesirable scenario for the Netherlands, while strengthened cooperation could offer opportunities to better secure its own safety and exert influence. In the following analysis, we will examine the tangible balance of power and ongoing cooperation initiatives before outlining various scenarios for the future.

Quantitative balance of power: spending, capacity & manpower

At first glance, Europe appears to have considerable resources to guarantee its own security. The combined defense expenditures of European NATO allies and EU member states were approximately four times higher than those of Russia in 2023 (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). In 2024, European defense spending (excluding the US) reached around $457 billion – an increase of 11.7% compared to the previous year and the tenth consecutive year of growth (Global Defence Spending Hits A New Peak | WE News English). For comparison: Russia increased its military budget to around 6.7% of its GDP in 2024 (more than doubling since before the invasion of 2022) (Global Defence Spending Hits A New Peak | WE News), but in absolute terms, this amounts to only a quarter of European combined expenditures. The economic basis is also substantial: the EU's GDP (plus the UK) is ten times larger than Russia's and comparable to that of the US (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR).

These financial figures translate into military capabilities on paper. European NATO countries collectively have around 1.5 million active military personnel (Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed | Bruegel) – a larger number than the US active army or Russian troop strength (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). Additionally, European defense companies produce some of the world's most modern weapon systems, ranging from advanced submarines to fighter jets, and five European countries are among the top ten arms exporters worldwide (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). This indicates a significant industrial and technological basis for defense. Europe as a whole is also impressive in terms of material: hundreds of combat aircraft, fleet capabilities from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, and armored brigades spread across the continent.

However, this optimistic macro-view fades upon closer examination of effective military capabilities. Decades of "peace dividend" policies (cuts after the Cold War) and the free-rider effect (relying on the US for expensive key enablers) have led to a certain atrophy of European military forces (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). Equipment modernization was postponed, and stockpiles (e.g., ammunition) are minimal. The war in Ukraine exposed weaknesses: when European countries wanted to supply large quantities of weapons and ammunition to Kyiv, it proved "complicated and slow" due to limited stockpiles and production capacity (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). Fragmentation also plays a role: those 1.5 million European military personnel are divided among dozens of national armies with their own structures, languages, and doctrines. They lack the integrated command structure that welds American troops into a cohesive fighting force (Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed | Bruegel). In a crisis scenario, effective bundling of these forces would be crucial; without coordinated command, European units risk being ineffective.

Moreover, there is the issue of burden sharing. For a long time, only a minority of NATO members met the norm of spending 2% of their GDP on defense, but this has changed dramatically since 2022. In 2024, 23 of the 32 NATO countries met the 2% norm, compared to only six countries in 2021 (Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine | Atlantic Council). The Russian offensive in Ukraine served as a wake-up call and led to an unprecedented increase (+18% in one year) in European NATO budgets (Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine | Atlantic Council). Poland leads the way with over 4% of its GDP spent on defense in 2024 (Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine | Atlantic Council), and countries like the Baltic states, Finland, and (within the EU) Sweden have also significantly increased their spending. Western and Southern European countries are still lagging behind (e.g., Italy is still below 1.5%) (There are 8 NATO countries under 2 percent GDP spending on | EU News), but an upward trend has begun there as well. The Netherlands has announced that it will exceed the 2% threshold for the first time in 2024 after years of cuts (Netherlands hikes defence spending to face new threats | Reuters).

Despite this positive development, experts warn that independent deterrence of Russia would require significant additional investments. According to a recent calculation, Europe would need to mobilize around 300,000 extra troops (comparable to the combat power of the current US contribution) and spend at least €250 billion extra per year to credibly counter a Russian attack (Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed | Bruegel). This would require almost doubling current expenditures within a few years – an immense task. The reason is that European armies have much overlap and inefficiencies; without the integrating factor of the US, they would either need to eliminate these inefficiencies through much closer coordination or compensate for fragmentation with extra troops and equipment (Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed | Bruegel). In other words: Europe can defend itself, but only with substantial and coordinated efforts. The tangible power potential is present, but to convert it into actual military strength requires political will and strategic vision – a recurring conclusion that we also find in various external analyses (Can Europe break free from NATO and forge its own security path? | Global Times). The real question is whether European powers can muster the political will and strategic vision needed to rise to the occasion.

Production capacity and the European defense industry

The extent to which Europe can develop an autonomous security architecture is closely tied to the defense industry and the broader industrial and raw materials base. During the Cold War, Western Europe maintained a substantial arms industry, but after 1990, domestic demand decreased drastically. Many European defense companies survived by focusing on export markets outside Europe (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR) (e.g., selling French and Swedish fighter jets, German submarines, etc.), while their own armed forces shrunk. This imbalance – being able to produce high-tech products but having limited domestic demand – led to a reduction in production capacity. For ammunition, spare parts, and basic equipment, the European production line has been hollowed out to a minimum to serve peacetime needs.

The war in Ukraine has made this painfully clear. The explosive demand for 155mm artillery shells, air defense missiles, and armored vehicles far exceeds what European factories can deliver directly. Defense industries are struggling to keep up with the sudden increase in orders and produce sufficient quantities in the short term (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). Delivery times are increasing, and without a coordinated approach, there is a risk that countries will compete with each other for scarce production capacity (e.g., multiple countries ordering the same scarce type of missile). To address this, the EU has introduced new instruments: a joint project has been launched to purchase millions of artillery shells in bulk for Ukraine and European stocks – financed through the European Peace Facility and an upcoming EU ammunition initiative – to force industrial scaling up. Additionally, the European Commission is working to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through subsidies from the European Defence Fund and coordination of research and development. The goal is to achieve dual capacity: meeting their own needs and reducing dependence on imports (particularly from American or Israeli weapon systems).

A crucial aspect is also the raw production capacity and supply of raw materials. Modern weapons require rare metals and high-quality electronics. Europe is vulnerable in this regard: it depends on Chinese exports for rare earth metals (crucial for electronics and electromotors) and semiconductors that are partially produced outside Europe. The Netherlands plays a strategic role in the high-tech chain through ASML (lithography machines for chips), illustrating that industrial power is not only about steel and coal but also about technology. In a scenario without American backing, Europe would need to pay more attention to raw material security and strategic stocks – something the EU is already working on through its raw materials strategy (Critical Raw Materials Act) to secure supplies of materials like lithium, nickel, and cobalt.

However, there are clearly strong advantages. European defense companies like Airbus, BAE Systems, Thales, Leonardo, and Rheinmetall are among the world's top players in their segments. New cooperation between countries leads to ambitious projects: France, Germany, and Spain are jointly developing the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) – a next-generation fighter jet/drone system – while another group (UK, Italy, Japan, and possibly the Netherlands) is working on the Tempest/GCAP fighter jet. Germany and France are planning a new main battle tank (MGCS) for around 2035 to replace the Leopard and Leclerc. Such programs pool resources and keep the industry innovative. If the US withdraws, the pressure would increase to make breakthrough projects like these succeed, as European countries would no longer be able to easily purchase ready-made American alternatives.

In summary, the European defense industry is an essential part of the security architecture: it must provide the backbone (equipment, ammunition, technology) for any strategy. The current trend shows an upswing – orders are increasing, and multiple countries are announcing investments in new production lines (e.g., new ammunition factories in Eastern Europe, additional shipyards in France/Italy). For the Netherlands, this offers opportunities: the Dutch industry (shipbuilding, high-tech sensor systems, etc.) can benefit from joint projects and increased spending, while the Dutch armed forces are also rebuilding their diminished capacities (the Netherlands is purchasing tanks for the first time in years and investing in new frigates, drones, and F-35s (Netherlands hikes defence spending to face new threats | Reuters)). At the same time, it is essential to remain realistic: scaling up production capacity takes time. These investments will only pay off in actual increased stocks and modernized arsenals over several years. For the next few years, Europe will remain in a transitional phase where the demand for security is high, but the means to fully provide it themselves still need to be scaled up.

Regional security interests and fragmentation risks

Geopolitically, Europe is not a monolith: different sub-regions have diverse security interests. This has always been the case, but with a strong American presence, Washington often served as the glue that held the alliance together – by providing shared analyses and military capabilities that benefited all allies. In a scenario with an absent or limited US presence, these fault lines could become more pronounced, with the risk of regional fragmentation in defense policy.

Eastern and Northern Europe: Countries on the eastern flank (Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and also Romania) see Russia as the overarching threat. They have proactively strengthened their defense in recent years: Poland is investing in a massive rearmament program (purchasing hundreds of tanks, howitzers, and aircraft, partly from South Korea) and has risen to the top 15 of global defense spenders in 2024 (Global Defence Spending Hits A New Peak | WE News). The Baltic countries spend well above the NATO average (Estonia around 3% of GDP). Finland, newly joined to NATO, brings a well-trained reserve army and modern equipment (F-35s, etc.). These countries will likely cooperate and invest even more intensively if American backing falls away, possibly through regional pacts. We already see initiatives like the Joint Expeditionary Force (a UK-led military group with North European countries, including the Netherlands) and close defense ties between Poland and its neighbors (the so-called Bucharest Nine cooperation). Eastern Europe is inclined to take a hardline approach: higher spending, strong deterrence, and if necessary, coalitions of the willing to discourage Russian aggression.

Southern Europe and the Mediterranean: Countries like Italy, Spain, Greece, and France (which is also a Mediterranean power) have a different set of priorities besides Russia. Instability in North Africa (Libya, Sahel region) and the Middle East (Syria, terrorism) affects them directly through migration flows and potential threats like terrorism. Turkey – a NATO member but a special case politically – is also an important player in the southern domain. Without a strong American anchor, these countries might focus more on crisis management in their own region: naval missions to manage migration, anti-terror operations, or stabilization missions where France has traditionally taken the lead (e.g., Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, now ended). There is a risk that the eastern and southern flanks will not always support each other if the primary threat differs. For example, Italy might be reluctant to send troops to the Baltic states, while Poland might have little interest in engaging in North African operations. If American pressure to do both disappears, Europe must achieve internal consensus – something that is complex. European countries have "different strategic priorities, which makes coordinated action more difficult" (How America’s changing Ukraine Policy Could Reshape Europe’s Future | Modern Diplomacy).

Western and Central Europe: This includes Germany, the Benelux countries, and to some extent Scandinavia and the UK. These countries have historically benefited from the US-led NATO structure and were perhaps less directly threatened than the eastern flank. Germany was in a comfortable middle position, but that is shifting: due to its economic weight and central location, leadership is now expected from Berlin (more on this in country analyses). The United Kingdom has a special role as a nuclear power and closest ally of the US – outside the EU but still one of the pillars of European security. Without the US, the UK might try to play a larger role as a security leader for Europe, but its resources are more limited than those of America.

We can imagine clusters emerging: for example, a Northwest European cluster around the UK (such as the JEF, with participation from the Netherlands, Norway, Baltic states), a Central European cluster around Germany (where the Netherlands already has integrated units with Germany, and where Czechia, Hungary, and others might join), and a South European cluster with France/Italy as the hub for the Mediterranean region. These clusters overlap to some extent and are not necessarily exclusive, but they could mean that there is no single European defense policy. Coordination would then need to occur through multilateral summits or the EU, but if security becomes regionalized, joint decision-making could become more complicated.

The EU is trying to prevent this by using instruments like the Strategic Compass (2022), which shares threat assessments, and through joint missions (e.g., in Africa) where burdens can be shared. NATO will continue to exist unless it completely falls apart, so it is also conceivable that NATO itself will reorganize: perhaps with more regional commanders (Europeans) operating independently while the alliance serves as an umbrella. However, analysts warn that if the US withdraws, European unity will be put to the test. Moscow might try to exploit any divisions (How America’s changing Ukraine Policy Could Reshape Europe’s Future | Modern Diplomacy). During the migration crisis in 2015, we saw how divided Europe can be; a more cunning geopolitical game by opponents could reignite this – think of Russia using energy as leverage between East and West or Turkey allowing refugees to flow into Europe to extract concessions.

In short, regional fragmentation is a real danger in a scenario without American glue. Preventing this requires conscious political choices: investing in shared threat analyses, being in solidarity with each other's concerns, and being willing to spend resources on both north/east security and southern flank stability. For the Netherlands, as a Northwest European country, it is important that protecting Baltic NATO allies and addressing instability on Europe's southern border are not seen as a choice between two evils but as a shared responsibility. Only then will the European security fabric remain intact.

European defense cooperation initiatives

Steps have been taken in recent years to bring European countries closer together on defense issues. These initiatives will increase in value as American input decreases. We briefly discuss the most important ones:

• NATO's Europeanization: Within NATO, there is a growing recognition of the need for Europe to take on more responsibility for its own defense. Policy documents emphasize the importance of European members taking "more responsibility for the defense of the continent" (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). In practice, this means filling capability gaps currently provided by Americans, such as strategic transport, intelligence sharing, missile defense, and cyber capabilities. NATO's own Defence Planning Process identifies these gaps and encourages European countries to fill them. A recent NATO initiative is the European Sky Shield: a German-led cooperation between 17 European countries (including the Netherlands) to jointly purchase and integrate air and missile defense systems. This is a direct response to the increased threat from Russian missiles and reduces dependence on American Patriot systems by jointly purchasing European and Israeli systems. Such projects illustrate the path towards a "more European-led NATO" – an opportunity to increase military integration and efficiency (How America’s changing Ukraine Policy Could Reshape Europe’s Future | Modern Diplomacy).
• EU defense cooperation (PESCO and EDF): Outside NATO, the EU has been actively promoting defense cooperation since 2017 through PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation). This includes dozens of projects ranging from a joint European hospital ship to cooperation on cyber defense. The Netherlands participates in multiple PESCO projects, including military mobility (simplifying troop transport across Europe). Additionally, there is the European Defence Fund (EDF), which for the first time allocates EU funds (billions of euros) to joint defense research and development projects. This aims to stimulate innovation and reduce fragmentation, by having consortia of companies/countries work together instead of conducting parallel research. All these steps promote interoperability and shared capabilities. However, the scale is still modest compared to the needs in a scenario without US involvement. EU operations (such as training missions in Africa or maritime operations in the Mediterranean) remain limited in terms of mandate and scope. Crucially, the EU does not have its own army: every mission or deployment depends on national contributions and unanimous decisions by member states.
• Bilateral and regional integration: A pragmatic form of cooperation is the direct integration of units between countries. The Netherlands and Germany are a leading example: Dutch brigades are integrated into German divisions, both countries share a tank battalion (since the Netherlands no longer has a full tank unit), and they cooperate on air defense. This increases the scale and effectiveness of both countries and can serve as an example for others. Belgium also has extensive cooperation with the Netherlands (e.g., joint naval command structure). The Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark) are strengthening their coordination now that Finland and Sweden are joining NATO; they have long shared intelligence and exercised together. This type of "mini-lateral" integration increases interdependence – a positive development, as it makes backtracking more difficult (countries genuinely need each other at the tactical level) and strengthens a shared strategic culture. In the future, such integration clusters could be expanded, for example by linking a Polish division to the German or French army structure or forming a joint Benelux brigade.
• Nuclear deterrence & high-end capabilities: A point of concern is that Europe without the US largely lacks two important things: a comprehensive nuclear guarantee and certain high-end military capabilities such as strategic bombers or large aircraft carriers. France and the United Kingdom have independent nuclear weapons, but France does not officially share its force de frappe as an EU deterrent (although Macron has suggested being open to dialogue on this). In an EU defense context, France's nuclear capacity could play a central role as an ultimate deterrent – with all the political sensitivities that come with it. The United Kingdom, despite Brexit, would also contribute to deterrence in a European framework (their Trident submarines remain a pillar of NATO's defense). Regarding conventional high-end capabilities: only France has an aircraft carrier in the EU, and there is still a gap in strategic air transport and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capacity. However, European countries are working to fill this gap partially (Airbus A400M transport aircraft, joint armed drones projects, etc.). It remains that nuclear guarantees are a more challenging aspect to address – one that might need to be maintained through NATO (American nuclear weapons in Europe) or through a political agreement recognizing French (and British) nuclear weapons as European deterrence.

In summary, there is a movement towards more European defense cooperation through various channels. If the American role decreases further, these initiatives will likely gain momentum. This could even create a positive feedback loop: the more Europe does together, the more credible its self-defense becomes, and the stronger the bonds between countries become, which counteracts fragmentation and stimulates even more cooperation. Analysts point out that such European strengthening is not necessarily against the US – the paradoxical effect could be that a stronger Europe keeps the transatlantic bond healthy because burdens are shared more fairly (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). A Europe that can defend itself is ultimately a more attractive partner than a dependent region.

Interests and strategies of European players

As Europe navigates its evolving security landscape, individual countries are developing their own strategies to address emerging challenges and protect their interests. This chapter delves into the interests and strategies of key European players, examining how they perceive their roles within the continent's security architecture and how they intend to contribute to its development. In the following sections, we will explore the unique perspectives and approaches of major European countries, including Germany, France, and the Netherlands. We will also consider the roles of other European countries and non-Western players who are increasingly influencing European security dynamics.

Germany

Germany has traditionally been Europe's largest economy, but that economic ight has not translated into military might. For years, Berlin spent less than 1.5% of its GDP on defense and relied on diplomacy and the NATO umbrella provided by the US. However, Russian aggression has brought about a Zeitenwende (a turning point): Chancellor Scholz announced a special fund of €100 billion in early 2022 to modernize the Bundeswehr and promised to take NATO commitments seriously. In 2024, Germany's defense budget increased by 23.2% - the strongest growth in Europe that year (Global Defence Spending Hits A New Peak | WE News). Nevertheless, there is still a gap between ambition and reality. Recent reports show that German forces are struggling with inadequate readiness and outdated equipment; even the promise to provide two NATO divisions by 2025-2027 is uncertain due to delays (Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed | Bruegel). The collapse of the coalition government in 2024 (mentioned in analyses) also casts uncertainty over the continuity of these investments (Global Defence Spending Hits A New Peak | WE News).

If the US withdraws, Europe will automatically look to Germany due to its weight. Germany's interest is then to maintain stability on the continent - Berlin is committed to the EU and NATO - but this requires a leading military role that the country has not had since 1945. We are cautiously seeing a change in mentality: German Defense Minister Pistorius warned that Germany must be "ready for war by 2029" and cannot assume that Putin will stop at Ukraine (Defending Europe with less America | ECFR). Such statements were previously unthinkable in Berlin. They indicate a strategy where Germany wants to take the lead in European defense together with partners (France for strategic autonomy, the US within NATO as long as they are present, and neighboring countries like the Netherlands in integrated units).

However, Germany continues to balance its approach: on the one hand, never going it alone (always operating in multilateral frameworks), and on the other hand, realizing that without a strong Bundeswehr, any European defense effort will be crippled. Germany's economic interests are global - from energy imports to export markets in China - and it therefore strives for stability and open routes. A too assertive military posture can meet internal resistance (German public opinion is traditionally more pacifist), but Germany also does not want to leave a vacuum in security. In short, Germany is undergoing a strategic transformation: from being restrained to becoming a responsible leader, driven by necessity.

For the Netherlands, this is of great importance: Dutch defense is partly integrated with Germany's, and German leadership within Europe can pose both opportunities (more cooperation, strengthening against threats) and risks (Germany pursuing its own course).

France

France has positioned itself for decades as the champion of European defense autonomy. President Macron has explicitly advocated for this with his call for "European strategic autonomy" and statements that Europe cannot rely on the United States indefinitely (How America’s changing Ukraine Policy Could Reshape Europe’s Future | Modern Diplomacy). French interests are twofold: security in Europe (deterring Russia) and the capacity to exert influence beyond Europe (Middle East, Africa, Indo-Pacific region where France has overseas territories). Among all EU countries, France possesses the most expeditionary military force: complete with a nuclear triad, an aircraft carrier, global bases (Djibouti, Sahel, Pacific islands), and experience in military interventions. In a scenario without American leadership, France would likely strive to be the military anchor of Europe – in tandem with Germany’s economic strength.

France already spends close to the NATO benchmark (around 1.9% of GDP) and invests heavily in modernization (nuclear updates, next-generation aircraft, etc.). Its defense industry is one of the largest in Europe, and Paris is keen to maintain its independence (preferring European weapons over importing American equipment, which sometimes creates friction with allies who, for example, favor the F-35 over the Rafale). France’s strategic culture emphasizes sovereignty: the ability to decide and act independently. This means that France sometimes pursues its own course within NATO – consider its temporary withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command in the 1960s under De Gaulle, or Macron’s dialogue with Russia prior to the invasion. However, since the war in Ukraine, France has stood shoulder to shoulder with its allies in strengthening the Eastern flank (French troops in Romania, Estonia) and supplying weapons to Ukraine.

Without the U.S., France’s nuclear capability would become even more unique in Europe’s defense. The Force de Frappe could be implicitly or explicitly deployed as a European guarantee against nuclear threats. This gives Paris political leverage but also responsibility. France will undoubtedly seek to expand its influence: for example, by taking the lead in EU defense initiatives, strengthening the Franco-German axis, and further developing initiatives like the European Intervention Initiative (EI2, a coalition of European countries for crisis intervention outside the EU/NATO framework). France’s interest lies in a Europe strong enough to stand on equal footing with superpowers like the U.S. and China, enabling it to pursue a course that serves French and European interests (which are not always identical to American interests, as seen in policies toward Iran or Africa).

For the Netherlands, France is both an important partner and a country with partially different priorities. The Netherlands has traditionally had an Atlantic orientation but has increasingly sought closer ties with France in the defense domain in recent years (e.g., participation in French initiatives, cooperation in training missions in Africa). In a scenario of European self-reliance, close coordination with France would be crucial, given France’s significant military capabilities and willingness to deploy them. At the same time, the Netherlands will be cautious about a purely French-driven agenda – Paris can be quite headstrong. A balance within the EU between French ambition and German pragmatism would likely best serve Dutch interests.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands, given its size and location between the major Western European players, has a security policy that is inextricably linked to alliances. As a founding member of both NATO and the EU, the Netherlands has always pursued collective security and the international rule of law. In recent decades, the country benefited from the peace dividend: defense spending fell to a low of around 1.1% of GDP by 2014, and military components (such as tanks) were scaled back. However, this trend has radically reversed since 2022. Under the influence of the Russian threat, the Netherlands has increased its defense budget. By 2024, the Netherlands is expected to meet the 2% GDP benchmark (Netherlands hikes defence spending to face new threats | Reuters) – for the first time since the agreement was made in 2014 – with a defense budget of around €24 billion (Netherlands hikes defence spending to face new threats | Reuters). This funding is being allocated to broad strengthening: the Netherlands is once again acquiring tanks (in cooperation with Germany), additional F-35 fighter jets, new naval ships, drones, air defense systems, and ample ammunition (Netherlands hikes defence spending to face new threats | Reuters). Ministerial rhetoric emphasizes that "new threats require action" and that even in peacetime, "our infrastructure is under daily attack in cyberspace" (Netherlands hikes defence spending to face new threats | Reuters). The political will to invest has thus grown significantly.

In a Europe without American support, the Netherlands is likely to pursue its security strategy along two tracks: intensive cooperation with immediate neighbors and allies, and active participation in coalitions that protect its values and security. The Netherlands is a pioneer in military cooperation with Germany (which would pay off in such a scenario, as the Dutch army would then be part of a larger German framework). Within NATO, the Netherlands often takes on a coordinating role; for example, it was one of the first countries to provide military assistance to Ukraine and mobilize partners – The Hague played a key role in the international coalition to deliver modern tanks and F-16s to Ukraine (Netherlands hikes defence spending to face new threats | Reuters). This demonstrates that despite its smaller size, the Netherlands is willing to take initiative within an alliance framework. This skill will prove useful if European countries must organize themselves: the Netherlands can act as a bridge-builder between Atlantic and European orientations, and between large and small states.

The Dutch interest is clear: a stable, united Europe where burdens are shared and international law prevails. The Netherlands, as a trading nation with critical transit infrastructure (Rotterdam, Schiphol), benefits from peace and predictability. At the same time, the Netherlands recognizes that without hard power, this cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, the Netherlands supports both NATO strengthening (it remains an advocate of close trans-Atlantic ties, including diplomatically) and deeper EU defense integration. Within the EU, the Netherlands was long hesitant about anything resembling an "EU army," but the tone has become more pragmatic: EU initiatives are now seen as complementary to NATO. In scenarios where NATO becomes less America-centric, the Netherlands can contribute through the EU line to ensure that European defense remains inclusive (i.e., not dominated solely by the major powers).

One area where the Netherlands is particularly focused is technological innovation, cyber security and autonomous systems. The Dutch Defense Ministry contributes to EU cooperation in cybersecurity and invests in an information-driven military. This aligns with the Dutch profile: highly developed, technologically advanced, but demographically limited (18 million inhabitants). Personnel are scarcer than, for example, in France or Poland; the Netherlands will prioritize quality over quantity. In a joint European defense plan, the Netherlands could take the lead in information and intelligence hubs, maritime security in the North Sea (essential for energy and communication, such as pipelines and data cables), and niche capabilities like the Patriot air defense system, which the Netherlands has operated for years.

In short, the Netherlands' strategy would be: multilateral where possible, bilateral where necessary – always ensuring it does not stand alone. A fragmented Europe would risk isolating the Netherlands or force it to choose between undesirable options; a closely cooperating Europe enables the Netherlands to punch above its weight and participate in decision-making.

Other & non-western players

Although the focus of the question is on the Netherlands, Germany, and France, the picture is incomplete without mentioning the United Kingdom and several important non-EU/NATO actors. The UK, despite Brexit, remains a crucial European military power with high defense spending (~2% of GDP), nuclear weapons, and projection capabilities. In the absence of the U.S., London would likely seek to retain a co-leadership role, probably through NATO and direct cooperation with Eastern Europe (the British have been training Ukrainian and Baltic troops for years and lead the aforementioned Joint Expeditionary Force). The UK’s interest lies in preventing a Europe without the U.S. from drifting toward a purely EU-dominated defense policy in which it has no say. It is reasonable to assume that the UK and EU partners (including the Netherlands) will find ways to continue intensive cooperation (e.g., through a new security pact or ad-hoc participation in PESCO projects). For the European defense industry, the UK also cannot be ignored: British and European companies are intertwined (BAE is involved in the Tempest project, Airbus has a UK branch, etc.).

From a non-Western perspective, it is interesting to consider how others might react to a Europe seeking its own path.

• China: Officially, Beijing welcomes a more independent Europe. Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that they view NATO as a Cold War relic "manipulated by the U.S. at the expense of European strategic autonomy". Chinese analysts and state media (such as Global Times) argue that Europe actually has the resources and experience to maintain its own security without the U.S., but lacks political will and vision (Can Europe break free from NATO and forge its own security path? | Global Times). In other words, they see Europe’s dependence on America as an illusion that must be broken for Europe’s own good. China’s interest here is clear: a trans-Atlantic split would weaken Western unity, which aligns with China’s pursuit of a multipolar world order. At the same time, China is wary of NATO expanding into Asia; it is no coincidence that as European NATO countries focus more on their own region, China sees less risk of NATO becoming active in, for example, the South China Sea. If Europe were to become stronger independently, China would likely seek to maintain good relations with European powers to prevent them from fully aligning with the U.S. strategy on China. We have already seen an example of this: Macron’s remarks in 2023, that Europe does not necessarily need to follow every U.S.-China confrontation, undoubtedly sounded like music to Beijing’s ears. China’s pressure on Europe will continue to be framed rhetorically as “pursue an independent foreign policy, follow your own interests” – which implicitly means: do not let Washington turn you against Beijing (European Strategic Autonomy and the Future of Sino-European Relations - Brian Wong | CHINA US Focus).
• Russia: Moscow’s view of a U.S.-less European security system is ambivalent but predominantly opportunistic. On the one hand, the Kremlin has spent decades trying to weaken the trans-Atlantic bond through propaganda and support for Eurosceptic voices, hoping to exploit a divided West. A reduction in the U.S. role would be seen as a win for Russia, as it “offers opportunities to exploit divisions in Europe” (How America’s changing Ukraine Policy Could Reshape Europe’s Future | Modern Diplomacy). In such a scenario, Russia could become more assertive in its neighborhood, calculating that European countries might respond less cohesively or with less military strength. At the same time, Russia might diplomatically attempt to woo some major European countries for an agreement that recognizes Russia’s sphere of influence in exchange for peace. One could speculate that Russia would like to see an arrangement where, for example, France and Germany find a modus vivendi with Russia (a new security architecture “from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” as once proposed), without American interference. However, the current reality after the intervention in Ukraine is that even without the U.S., most Europeans remain deeply distrustful of Russia. In any scenario, Russia remains a medium-term threat in the eyes of Europe, which actually encourages their cooperation. An interesting question is whether Russia would believe that a European-led NATO is less willing to defend the eastern flank than a U.S.-led NATO. If so, there is a risk that Moscow might test NATO solidarity. For example, a provocation or incident in the Baltic to see if Europe is truly prepared. This makes it all the more important for Europe to appear united and strong, in order to avoid miscalculations.
• Other non-Western actors: Countries in the Middle East and Africa might approach a more independent EU as a new security actor. Without American dominance, there is room for Europe to launch its own initiatives in these regions – whether in competition with players like Russia, China, or Turkey. For example, North Africa might prefer European stabilization missions over no assistance or purely Russian interference. On the other hand, a more assertive Europe could evoke memories of the colonial past, so it will need to act diplomatically with caution. In general, many Global South countries welcome multipolarity; a Europe that does not necessarily follow the U.S. could represent an additional partner or balancing force for them. For instance, India maintains good relations with France and sees European power balancing as favorable, as long as it does not unequivocally take sides in the U.S.-China rivalry.

In summary, external actors see a changing Europe as both an opportunity and a challenge: the global power balance could shift if Europe strengthens itself or weakens due to a lack of American support. It is clear that perceptions play a major role here – Europe must not only be factually capable of defending itself but also project credibility externally. For this, internal cohesion and strategic clarity are paramount (but not guaranteed).

Scenario's: Future of European security

Below, we outline four possible scenarios for European security architecture over the next decade, assuming a significant reduction in U.S. involvement. For each scenario, we discuss its core features and the implications for the Netherlands in terms of opportunities and risks.

Scenario 1: "Strategic autonomy" - Integrated European defense

Core: In this scenario, European countries succeed in uniting and building a largely self-sufficient collective defense system. NATO continues to exist but effectively transforms into a European pillar capable of operating independently of the U.S. European leaders develop a joint security policy: they align threat assessments and invest in complementary military capabilities. Major steps are taken in interoperability—for example, establishing a European headquarters capable of planning and leading military operations (something the EU currently lacks). France shares (to a limited extent) its nuclear guarantee with the rest of Europe, ensuring it contributes to European deterrence. Germany, France, and the UK (though outside the EU, still participating) take the lead, with medium-sized countries like the Netherlands actively shaping the framework. Importantly, this scenario requires overcoming all political objections—sovereignty is (partially) exchanged for collective security. However, the urgency of the situation (the absent U.S. and persistent external threats) creates the political will to do so.

Opportunities for the Netherlands:

• Strengthened Security Guarantee: An integrated Europe means an attack on one is truly an attack on all, even without U.S. support. For the Netherlands, collective defense becomes more robust and credible than a patchwork system.
• Shaping Policy: As a strong advocate of multilateralism, the Netherlands can exert disproportionate influence in shaping joint strategies (especially compared to its weight under U.S. hegemony). Dutch diplomacy and values (human rights, international law) can have a greater impact on European policy.
• Efficiency and Industry: Instead of 27 countries developing or purchasing equipment separately, this is done collectively. This is cheaper and more effective. The Dutch defense industry can secure contracts, particularly in naval and high-tech sectors, and access military assets (e.g., tanks, air defense) that would be unaffordable alone.
• Reduced Dependence on Unpredictable Actors: Strategic autonomy reduces vulnerability to political shifts in Washington. The Netherlands need not fear sudden U.S. policy changes and can rely on European solidarity, which is based on reciprocity.

Risks for the Netherlands:

• Complex Coordination: An integrated European defense model requires intricate coordination. Decision-making may be slow with so many players. The Netherlands may become frustrated by disagreements (e.g., over interventions outside Europe).
• Costs and Commitments: While cooperation brings efficiency, the Netherlands will need to invest significantly more (potentially 2.5%-3% of GDP) to contribute to ambitious capacity-building. It may also mean Dutch troops are deployed more frequently for collective interests, requiring domestic support.
• Dominance of Major Powers: There is a risk that large countries (France, Germany) dominate decision-making, leaving smaller countries like the Netherlands with less influence than hoped. The Netherlands must actively build coalitions to avoid being overshadowed by a "directorate" of major powers.
• Trans-Atlantic Drift: A highly autonomous Europe could lead to long-term estrangement from the U.S. If Americans perceive European self-reliance as unwillingness to cooperate, broader political and economic relations could suffer. The Netherlands, as a traditionally Atlanticist country, would need to navigate carefully to maintain ties (e.g., in technology, intelligence-sharing).

Scenario 2: "Fragmented and divided" - Regional security cooperation

Core: In this scenario, European unity fails. Without the U.S., NATO collapses as an effective alliance; Article 5 exists on paper but lacks credibility, as there is no American backing and Europeans cannot act collectively. Instead, regional blocs or ad-hoc coalitions emerge. For example: an Eastern European bloc led by Poland (with the Baltics, possibly the UK, and U.S. involvement through bilateral pacts); a French-led group for Southern European interventions; and a German-led group attempting to cover Central Europe but without a clear strategy. Some countries may even lean toward neutrality or seek agreements with Russia or other major powers (e.g., Hungary balancing between East and West). Arms programs are not coordinated but rather a race: each country tries to arm itself quickly, leading to duplication (ten different tanks, multiple aircraft types) and less standardization. Political EU action on security is paralyzed by mutual distrust.

Opportunities for the Netherlands:

• Flexibility in Partnerships: The Netherlands would be free to choose its partners on a case-by-case basis. For example, it could closely align with Germany and Scandinavian countries for Northern European security and avoid involvement in Southern issues if desired. This focus could enhance effectiveness in its immediate environment.
• Independent Choices: Fragmentation means no obligations from the EU or NATO forcing unwanted deployments. The Netherlands retains full sovereignty to decide where to send troops or not. In theory, it could focus on its own priorities (e.g., maritime security, cyber defense).
• Bilateral Ties with UK/U.S.: The Netherlands could cultivate bilateral relations with the UK and potentially the U.S. (outside NATO). This could provide an alternative safety net: if the U.S. is willing to help, the Netherlands could benefit as a loyal partner (albeit on an ad-hoc basis).

Risks for the Netherlands:

• Security Vacuum: This scenario is highly unfavorable for collective security. The Netherlands, as a small country, cannot address all threats alone. Without a reliable alliance, deterrence against a major power (e.g., Russia) is weak. If the Eastern flank falls, the Netherlands is ultimately at risk, as there is no overall defense plan.
• Massive Rearmament Required: To be somewhat secure, the Netherlands would need to invest disproportionately in defense—potentially 3%-4% of GDP—to sustain a mini-alliance (e.g., with Germany). The pressure on the budget and other policy priorities (healthcare, climate) would be significant, sparking societal debate.
• Economic Damage: Security fragmentation could accompany political tensions in the EU, harming the internal market and investment climate. The Netherlands, as a trading nation, would suffer from a politically divided Europe. Conflicts (including hybrid ones) are more likely to arise closer to home, destabilizing trade and investments.
• No Unified External Front: The Netherlands is weaker in negotiations with major powers without an EU bloc behind it. Issues like cybersecurity, Chinese influence, and migration agreements could be exploited by external actors. This means a loss of control over external influences affecting Dutch society (e.g., Russian interference, Chinese economic pressure).
• Uncertainty in Crises: In this scenario, the Netherlands cannot be sure who will assist in a crisis. Solidarity is not guaranteed, even in domestic security issues (e.g., counterterrorism, energy supply security) where EU/NATO partners previously stepped in.

Scenario 3: "European pillar within a shrunken NATO" - Half autonomous compromise

Core: This scenario lies between the previous two. The U.S. reduces its presence, but NATO remains operational as a unifying framework. Europe forms a stronger pillar within NATO: European countries coordinate more closely and take on the bulk of responsibilities, while the U.S. plays a support role (e.g., providing nuclear guarantees and assistance in extreme emergencies). NATO functions similarly to today, but in a crisis, 80% of troops and resources come from Europe instead of ~50% now. The U.S. may continue to offer political support (in forums and through deterrence statements) but station very few troops. Strategically, the U.S. puts Europe "on its own feet" to focus on Asia but does not sever ties—it remains a kind of insurance policy in the background.

For Europe, this means scaling up significantly (as discussed quantitatively), but within the familiar NATO structures. There is no separate European army; instead, NATO troops are reconfigured (more European commanders, possibly a non-American Secretary-General, etc.). The EU supports this through capacity-building and coordinating defense industry policy, but actual defense remains NATO-led. This is an evolution of the status quo: since 2022, we have already seen more European input, which would continue. However, the U.S. "floor" of involvement is lower: they might clarify that Article 5 support no longer automatically includes large troop deployments but may involve nuclear deterrence or material aid. To maintain credibility, European allies agree to significantly expand and maintain rapid-response forces.

Opportunities for the Netherlands:

• Preservation of Familiar Structures: The Netherlands is deeply familiar with NATO and values it. In this scenario, NATO remains intact, providing a trusted environment for Dutch diplomacy and military operations. Continuity in planning and standardization is ensured.
• Gradual Strengthening: Instead of a radical leap toward autonomy, the Netherlands (and others) can grow into their roles step by step. This is likely more financially and politically feasible. Burden-sharing becomes fairer without the abruptness of going it alone.
• Continued Trans-Atlantic Ties: The connection with the U.S. remains, albeit changed. The Netherlands retains access to U.S. intelligence, high-tech, and potentially a safety net in extreme crises (though this is not guaranteed). Strategically, the U.S. remains an ally, which is important given global challenges (e.g., China, terrorism) where the Netherlands stands alongside the U.S.
• Room for EU Defense Initiatives: Simultaneously, the Netherlands can continue building EU cooperation as a complementary layer. There is no contradiction: a stronger European pillar requires better EU collaboration. The Netherlands can pursue the best of both worlds—NATO for hard security, the EU for industrial and political cooperation.

Risks for the Netherlands:

• Ambiguity in Crises: If the U.S. role is unclear ("will they come to our aid in an Article 5 situation?"), this could sow confusion at critical moments. Adversaries might gamble that the U.S. will stay out, while European countries may assume the U.S. will eventually help. This ambiguity could complicate strategic decision-making.
• Half-Hearted European Commitment: There is a risk that European countries in this scenario lean back too much, assuming NATO will continue to function. The urgency to reform and invest may diminish once immediate pressure subsides, leading to a "not-quite-there" capacity level. The Netherlands could still find itself in an underprepared Europe when push comes to shove.
• Parallel Structures: Maintaining NATO while expanding EU responsibilities could lead to overlap and inefficiencies. For example, if both NATO and the EU plan for the same threats, duplication may occur. The Netherlands may need to invest more in bureaucratic coordination (in Brussels, Mons, etc.), requiring resources and attention.
• Dependence on U.S. Technology: In this compromise scenario, Europeans will likely continue using much U.S. equipment (e.g., F-35 jets, American missiles). This maintains a dependency on U.S. supply chains and politics (e.g., the U.S. could restrict deliveries). For the Netherlands, which already relies heavily on U.S. equipment, this is familiar but could become problematic in a crisis where the U.S. prioritizes Asia (e.g., ammunition for Patriots not being delivered because it is sent to Taiwan).

Scenario 4: "A Europe divided between East and West"

Core: In this scenario, the U.S. withdrawal exacerbates existing divisions within Europe, particularly between Western and Eastern member states. Western Europe, led by France and Germany, prioritizes strategic autonomy and focuses on building an EU-led defense framework. Meanwhile, Eastern European countries, feeling exposed to Russian threats, seek closer ties with the UK and other non-EU NATO members or even bilateral security guarantees from the U.S. This creates a two-tier Europe, with divergent security priorities and weakened solidarity.

Opportunities for the Netherlands:

• Bridge-Building Role: The Netherlands, with its Atlanticist orientation and strong ties to both Western and Eastern Europe, could act as a mediator, helping to bridge the divide and maintain some level of cohesion.
• Focus on Core Interests: The Netherlands could concentrate on protecting its immediate interests, such as securing the North Sea and maintaining trade routes, without being drawn into broader European conflicts.

Risks for the Netherlands:

• Strategic Dilemmas: The Netherlands might face difficult choices between supporting Western European initiatives (e.g., EU defense integration) and backing Eastern European calls for stronger NATO commitments.
• Weakened Deterrence: A divided Europe could embolden Russia, increasing the risk of conflict in Eastern Europe and potentially drawing the Netherlands into a larger confrontation.
• Loss of Influence: In a divided Europe, the Netherlands’ ability to shape the broader security agenda could diminish, particularly if it is seen as too closely aligned with one side.

Conclusion

The next decade is crucial for European security architecture. With a potentially retreating U.S., responsibility falls squarely on Europe. Quantitatively, Europe has the potential: economic strength, military numbers, and industrial know-how to make an impact. But the challenge is qualitative and political: can European states act in unison, efficiently pool resources, and muster the will to invest in power projection and deterrence? The Dutch perspective emphasizes cooperation above all—in no scenario is the Netherlands better off going it alone. For the Netherlands, a stable and secure international environment is vital, as its prosperity hinges on open trade routes, reliable partnerships, and secure markets. A cohesive and coordinated Europe not only enhances Dutch security but also safeguards its economic interests, ensuring access to markets and stability for its trade-dependent economy. Fragmentation, by contrast, undermines these foundations, exposing the Netherlands to heightened risks and uncertainties that could disrupt its trade and strategic position.

For Dutch foreign and defense policy, this means preparing for all options but actively working to realize the more favorable scenarios. In practice, the Netherlands will continue advocating for trans-Atlantic cohesion while strengthening its own and European defense ("NATO where possible, EU where necessary" could be the motto). The Netherlands can leverage its role as a connector: between the EU and NATO, between Eastern and Western Europe, and between large and small states. In doing so, it might play a leading role in managing the balance of power and addressing competition among European states.