Forces of Western Europe: A Quantitative Analysis

Abstract: A quantitative analysis of the military balance of power among five principal Western European nations—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium—as of 2025. The assessment is conducted using the Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) methodology. The strategic context for this analysis is a hypothetical future in which the United States has significantly reduced its security role in Europe, compelling these nations to ensure their own and collective defense in order to establish a new strategic equilibrium.

Introduction

The Post-American European Security Paradigm

The analytical framework of this report is predicated on the strategic scenario articulated by (NWISS, 2025), wherein the United States' security umbrella over Europe is significantly diminished. This paradigm shift fundamentally alters the strategic calculus for European nations, moving from a collective defense posture within a US-led alliance to a more complex environment of self-reliance, intra-European cooperation, and potential competition. The imperative for "strategic autonomy" and the inherent "risk of fragmentation" due to divergent threat perceptions—such as Eastern European focus on Russia versus Southern European concerns over North Africa—necessitate a clear-eyed assessment of the tangible military capabilities each Western European power possesses.

Consequently, this analysis applies the COFM methodology not in its traditional context of measuring a bloc's strength against an external adversary, but as a tool to quantify the relative military weight of key European powers. The resulting scores are not intended to predict outcomes of hypothetical intra-European conflicts but rather to measure the military capital each nation contributes to a new European security architecture. The balance of power revealed herein informs an understanding of potential leadership roles, contributions to coalitions, and areas of strategic dependency within this new landscape.

Methodology: The Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM)

The COFM methodology provides a structured, data-driven approach to assessing military power, moving beyond simplistic "bean counting" to account for the qualitative differences between weapon systems (RAND, 2020).

Originating in Soviet military planning during the latter half of the 20th century, COFM was designed as a mathematical tool to predict battlefield outcomes and optimize force allocation (Spurlin et al.). The methodology has since been adopted and refined by Western militaries, including the United States Army, where it serves as a key component of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The core purpose of COFM is to provide an objective ratio of combat power to inform initial assessments, course of action development, and wargaming (Hogg, 1993).

The central metric in this analysis is Combat Potential (CP), or boevoi potentsial (RAND, 2020). As defined in Russian military science and detailed in RAND Corporation analysis, CP is an "integral indicator that characterizes the maximal total of executed tasks using the full purpose [of the weapon/equipment] in implementing the finite tactical-technical characteristics in a given time under average (typical) hypothetical conditions". It is a numerical coefficient that represents the relative contribution of a weapon system to the outcome of a combat action compared to a standard reference system. This allows for a more nuanced comparison than a one-to-one count; for example, it can quantify the superior capability of a 5th-generation fighter over a 4th-generation one.

The aggregate combat potential (P) of a force is the sum of the products of the number of individual assets (ni​) and their respective combat potential coefficients (CPi​). The correlation of forces between Force A and Force B is then expressed as the ratio PA​/PB​.

To ensure a consistent and transparent analysis, this paper establishes a reference system for each military domain, assigning it a CP value of 1.00. All other systems within that domain are assigned a relative CP value based on their technical characteristics, such as firepower, mobility, protection, and technological sophistication. The reference systems for this report are:

• Land Systems: Leopard 2A7V Main Battle Tank (MBT)
• Maritime Systems: Type 26
• Air Systems: Eurofighter Typhoon (Tranche 3/4) Combat Aircraft

Limitations and scope

This paper adheres strictly to a quantitative application of COFM. It provides a correlation of forces and means—the tangible, quantifiable aspects of military power. It does not attempt to calculate Correlation of Forces and Means in the broader sense, which would incorporate intangible and highly subjective variables such as troop morale, leadership quality, training standards, and the impact of terrain and weather. While these factors are critically important in determining the actual outcome of a conflict, their quantification is beyond the scope of this objective assessment and is reserved for subsequent qualitative analysis.

Combat Potential Assessment: Land Systems

The land domain remains the decisive theater for controlling territory in Europe. This section assesses the combat potential of the five nations' primary land-based platforms, using the German Leopard 2A7V MBT as the benchmark with a CP of 1.00. This system is selected for its widespread adoption, advanced features, and its role as a de facto standard for modern European heavy armor.

Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)

The MBT remains the cornerstone of conventional land power, combining mobility, protection, and firepower. The nations under review exhibit significant divergence in both the quantity and quality of their tank fleets.

• Germany: The Bundeswehr operates the largest and most powerful tank force in this analysis, with an inventory of approximately 310 Leopard 2 tanks of various advanced models (2A6, 2A7V) (Heiming, 2024). While massive expansion plans to 600 or more Leopard 2A8s are underway, the 2025 assessment is based on the current operational fleet (Litnarovych, 2025). The Leopard 2A7V serves as the reference (CP=1.00), with the slightly less advanced 2A6 variants assigned a CP of 0.95.
• United Kingdom: The British Army is in the process of upgrading 148 Challenger 2 tanks to the new Challenger 3 standard. This upgrade is substantial, featuring a new Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore cannon, improved armor, and new sights. Reflecting its qualitative edge, the Challenger 3 is assigned a CP of 1.05 as opposed to the Challenger 2 which has a CP of 0.85. However, the small size of this fleet—described as a "boutique capability"—is its defining characteristic, meaning that there are no combat-ready Challenger 3 tanks until at least 2027 (Latham, 2025).
• France: The French Army is modernizing 200 of its Leclerc tanks to the Leclerc XLR standard, with 51 slated for delivery by the end of 2025 (DSM, 2025). The Leclerc XLR features enhanced protection and integration into the SCORPION network-centric warfare system. Its combination of a capable autoloader and advanced electronics warrants a CP of 1.02, placing it qualitatively between the Leopard 2A7V and Challenger 3.
• Netherlands: The Royal Netherlands Army fields a single company of 18 Leopard 2A6 MBTs, which are leased from Germany and integrated into a joint German-Dutch tank battalion (Casimiro, 2025). Plans to acquire 46 new Leopard 2A8s are in motion, but for 2025, the force consists of the 18 existing A6 models (CP=0.95).
• Belgium: The Belgian Land Component has no MBTs in its inventory, having retired its Leopard 1 fleet and transitioned to an all-wheeled force (Army Recognition, 2019).

Infantry Fighting & Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles

The capabilities of mechanized infantry are determined by their transport and fire support vehicles. Here, a mix of tracked and wheeled philosophies is evident.

• Germany: The German Army fields one of the world's most advanced IFVs, the Puma, with approximately 350 in service (Litnarovych, 2025). Its combination of high protection, advanced sensors, and a 30mm cannon gives it a CP of 0.80. This is complemented by a growing fleet of Boxer 8x8 Armored Vehicles, a highly mobile and modular platform (CP=0.65). Although Germany is phasing out the Marder IFV, which is being replaced by the Puma, it still operates a fleet of 262 Marders (Arm Technology, 2024).
• United Kingdom: The UK's future armored force is based on two core platforms: the tracked Ajax family (589 planned) and the wheeled Boxer (623 planned) (Brooke-Holland, 2025). The Ajax reconnaissance vehicle, armed with a 40mm CTA cannon, is a potent platform assigned a CP of 0.75. The Boxer provides commonality with Germany and the Netherlands. Although the above-mentioned force composition is planned, the UK currently operates 613 Warrior IFVs (CP=0.5), 502 Jackal MPVs (CP=0.2) and 744 Bulldog APCs (CP=0.25) (UK MoD, 2025).
• France: The French SCORPION program is centered on a wheeled philosophy. The Jaguar EBRC (135 planned by 2025) is a reconnaissance and combat vehicle armed with a 40mm CTA cannon and Akeron MP anti-tank missiles, warranting a high CP of 0.85 (GIFAS, 2025). It is complemented by the Griffon VBMR, the replacement for the VAB APC, which will be fielded in large numbers (target of 1,872) and is valued for its network-centric design (CP=0.55) (DGA, 2022).
• Netherlands: The Dutch operate a formidable fleet of 144 CV9035NL tracked IFVs, 122 of which are undergoing a significant mid-life upgrade (MLU) with a new turret and active protection system (Thomas, 2024). The upgraded CV90 is one of the most capable IFVs in Europe (CP=0.82). This is paired with 200 Boxer vehicles (Calibre Defence, 2025).
• Belgium: The Belgian force relies on a fleet of approximately 138 Piranha IIIC wheeled vehicles in various configurations (Defense News, 2017). While capable, they are a generation behind the Boxer and Griffon and are assigned a lower CP (Piranha DF90 CP=0.50, Piranha APC CP=0.35, avg. weighted at 0.42). Belgium is also procuring Griffon and Jaguar vehicles as part of the CaMo partnership with France (Terre, 2024).

Artillery Systems

Long-range fires are critical for shaping the battlefield. The capabilities in this area vary dramatically.

• Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPH): Germany and the Netherlands operate the PzH 2000, widely regarded as one of the world's best SPHs due to its range, rate of fire, and armor protection (CP=0.90) (Kadam, 2022). Germany maintains an operational inventory of over 100 systems, while the Netherlands fields around 24 (Darling, 2024). France's CAESAR truck-mounted howitzer offers superior strategic mobility and rapid deployment at the cost of crew protection (CP=0.80), with approximately 63 in service (Belli, 2025). The UK has donated its AS-90 fleet to Ukraine and currently relies on a small stop-gap force of 14 Archer systems (CP=0.9) (Brooke-Holland, 2025). Belgium is currently operating 14 GIAT LG-1 Mk II Towed Howitzers (CP=0.35) (UNROCA, 2024), but procuring 27 CAESAR Mk II systems, although they are not yet in service in (Auran, 2024).
• Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS): The UK has made a significant investment in its M270 MLRS fleet, which is being modernized and expanded to a total of 76 launchers, giving it the most powerful rocket artillery force in this group (CP=1.20) (Military News, 2025). Germany operates a capable force of 35-40 modernized MARS II systems (CP=1.20) (Höller, 2025). France possesses a minimal capability with only 9 LRU systems (Lageneau, 2025). The Netherlands and Belgium have no comparable systems.

The land power assessment reveals a clear triad of doctrines. Germany is postured for high-intensity, attritional warfare with a massive heavy armored force. France has prioritized a lighter, wheeled, and networked force designed for rapid intervention. The UK fields a smaller, technologically exquisite force, while the Benelux nations integrate into the German and French models. This divergence suggests that while Germany holds a decisive advantage in raw combat potential, a conflict's nature would heavily favor one doctrine over another; a war of maneuver would suit the French, while a static, frontal war would suit the Germans.

Combat Potential Assessment: Maritime Platforms

In a European context, maritime power is essential for securing sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Atlantic, North Sea, and Mediterranean, enabling economic activity, and projecting power into contested littoral zones. This section evaluates the naval forces of the five nations, with a particular focus on the unique and decisive capability of aircraft carriers. A modern anti-submarine warfare (ASW) frigate, the British Type 26, serves as the reference platform with a CP of 1.00.

Special Assessment: The European Aircraft Carrier

The aircraft carrier is the ultimate expression of maritime power, but its value in a confined, high-threat European battlespace must be assessed differently from its role in global power projection. The analysis here focuses on its utility for sea control, economic blockade, and as a sovereign command hub, while factoring in its vulnerability to peer-competitor threats.

• Assets: The United Kingdom operates two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, and France operates one nuclear-powered carrier, the Charles de Gaulle (WDMMW, 2025).
• Combat Potential Calculation: A multi-factor model is applied:
  • Offensive Power (Air Wing): The core of a carrier's potential is its air wing. The UK's carriers are designed to embark up to 40 F-35B Lightning II aircraft, a 5th-generation stealth platform with a very high individual CP (Allison, 2024). The FrenchCharles de Gaulle embarks approximately 30 Rafale M fighters, a highly capable 4.5-generation aircraft (DefAsia, 2025). The F-35B's superior stealth and sensors give it a qualitative advantage that, combined with the QE-class's larger air wing capacity, results in a significantly higher baseline CP for the British carriers.
  • Utility Multiplier (Sovereignty & Command): A carrier is more than just a floating airfield; it is a sovereign, mobile territory and a command-and-control hub. This allows a nation to project air power and command a joint task force without reliance on host-nation basing, a critical factor in a fragmented Europe. To represent this strategic value, a utility multiplier of 1.2 is applied to the air wing's base CP.
  • Vulnerability Reducer (Peer Threat): In the confined waters of Europe, carriers are vulnerable to a dense network of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, including advanced submarines, land-based anti-ship ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and massed air attacks. To account for this heightened risk compared to open-ocean operations, a vulnerability reducer of -25% is applied to the total score.

The resulting CP for a single fully equipped Queen Elizabeth-class carrier is calculated to be approximately 54.0, while the Charles de Gaulle scores approximately 29.7. These exceptionally high values reflect their status as the single most powerful conventional military assets in Europe.

Surface Combatants (Destroyers & Frigates)

The frigate and destroyer fleets form the backbone of naval presence and are the primary platforms for air defense and anti-submarine warfare.

• United Kingdom: The Royal Navy operates a powerful escort fleet, spearheaded by 6 Type 45 Daring-class air defense destroyers, among the most capable in the world (CP=1.80) (WDMMW, 2025). These are complemented by a force of 8 Type 23 frigates, which are being replaced by 8 Type 26 ASW frigates (CP=1.00) and 5 Type 31 general-purpose frigates (CP=0.70) (Brooke-Holland, 2025).
• France: The Marine Nationale fields a balanced fleet of 2 Horizon-class air defense destroyers (CP=1.70) and 8 Aquitaine-class FREMM frigates, which have a potent land-attack and ASW capability (CP=1.10). These are supplemented by 5 La Fayette-class general-purpose frigates (CP=0.50) (WDMMW, 2025).
• Germany: The German Navy operates a modern surface fleet optimized for high-intensity conflict in the Baltic and North Seas. It includes 3 Sachsen-class (F124) air defense frigates (CP=1.20) and 4 Brandenburg-class (F123) frigates (CP=0.80). The 4 new Baden-Württemberg-class (F125) frigates are large but lightly armed for stabilization operations and are assigned a lower CP (0.75) (Wikipedia, 2025).
• Netherlands: The Royal Netherlands Navy possesses 4 highly capable De Zeven Provinciën-class air and missile defense frigates (CP=1.30) and 2 Karel Doorman-class multi-purpose frigates (CP=0.70) (WDMMW, 2025).
• Belgium: The Belgian Naval Component operates 2 Karel Doorman-class frigates (CP=0.70), operating in close cooperation with the Dutch Navy (WDMMW, 2025).

Submarine Forces

Submarines provide a crucial stealthy capability for intelligence gathering, sea denial, and land attack.

• United Kingdom & France: These two nations are the only ones to operate nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The UK has 5 advanced Astute-class SSNs (CP=5.0), while France has a mix of 3 new Suffren-class (CP=4.8) and 2 older Rubis-class SSNs (CP=2.5) (WDMMW, 2025). The superior speed, endurance, and payload of SSNs give them a commanding CP advantage.
• Germany & Netherlands: These nations operate some of the world's most advanced conventional diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), which are exceptionally quiet and well-suited for littoral operations. Germany has 6 Type 212A submarines (CP=3.0), and the Netherlands has 3 operational Walrus-class submarines (CP=2.0) (WDMMW, 2025).
• Belgium: Belgium does not operate submarines.

The maritime data reveals a fundamental divide. The UK and France, by virtue of their aircraft carriers, are the only nations capable of independent, large-scale sea control operations. Germany and the Netherlands possess powerful fleets for sea denial and escort duties within specific theaters but would be dependent on Franco-British carrier air cover for any sustained operations far from friendly shores. This creates a strategic fault line in European naval power, giving London and Paris significant leverage in any future maritime coalition.

Combat Potential Assessment: Aerospace Systems

Air and aerospace power provides the ability to control the skies, strike targets at depth, and deploy forces rapidly. This section assesses the combat aircraft and critical force enablers of the five nations. The Eurofighter Typhoon (Tranche 3/4), a mature and highly capable 4.5-generation platform, is the reference system with a CP of 1.00.

Combat Aircraft

The quality and quantity of a nation's fighter fleet are primary indicators of its air power.

• 5th Generation (F-35 Lightning II): The F-35's combination of stealth, advanced sensors, and network-centric capabilities makes it the most potent combat aircraft in the region, assigned a CP of 1.50. The United Kingdom is a key partner in the program and will have its first tranche of 47 F-35B STOVL variants delivered by the end of 2025 (Allison, 2024). The Netherlands is well into its transition, operating a fleet of 46 (Dirksen, 2024) F-35A variants out of a planned 52 (Ruitenberg, 2025). Belgium has ordered 45 F-35As, with the first aircraft arriving in-country in 2025 (Greet, 2025). Germany has 35 F-35As on order, but these will not be operational in 2025 (Kuchikov, 2025). France does not operate the F-35.
• 4.5 Generation (Rafale & Typhoon): These aircraft form the bulk of the European fighter inventory. France's Dassault Rafale is a highly capable "omnirole" aircraft. The latest F4 standard is assigned a CP of 1.10. France operates a fleet of approximately 109 for the Air and Space Force and 41 for the Navy (Jean-Marc, 2025). The Eurofighter Typhoon is operated by the UK (107 Tranche 2/3 aircraft) and Germany (approx. 138 aircraft) (Drummond, 2025). As the reference system, its advanced variants are assigned a CP of 1.00.
• Legacy Aircraft: The German Air Force still operates a fleet of Panavia Tornado aircraft for strike and electronic warfare roles (Trevithick, 2019). The Netherlands and Belgium are phasing out their F-16AM/BM fleets as the F-35 enters service. For 2025, the Netherlands has no operational F-16s left for combat roles, having donated its fleet (Lake, 2025), while Belgium retains an operational fleet of around 43 F-16s (CP=0.60) pending their transfer to Ukraine and replacement by the F-35 (Greet, 2025).

Aggregate Correlation of Forces and Means

This section consolidates the combat potential assessments from the preceding sections into a final quantitative comparison. The data is first presented for each nation individually to provide transparency on the calculations, followed by a consolidated table that directly compares the five powers across all domains.

United Kingdom

Total CP: 1226.20

France

Total CP: 851.85

Germany

Total CP: 1433.84

The Netherlands

Total CP: 387.58

Belgium

Total CP: 100.56

Country Comparison

Summary of Quantitative Findings

The consolidated COFM table reveals a distinct hierarchy of military power. Germany emerges with the highest aggregate land combat potential, driven by its large fleets of MBTs, IFVs, and SPHs. The United Kingdom's land power is inflated by the high quantity of Ajax and Boxer vehicles planned for its inventory, though its MBT and artillery forces are comparatively small. France's score reflects its balanced but smaller wheeled force.

In the maritime domain, the United Kingdom and France are in a class of their own. The immense combat potential assigned to their aircraft carriers gives them scores that are an order of magnitude greater than the other nations. The UK's two-carrier fleet, equipped with 5th-generation aircraft, gives it a decisive edge.

The air domain is more competitive. France's large and modern Rafale fleet, combined with its sovereign enablers, gives it the highest score. The UK's mix of F-35s and Typhoons, also supported by a robust tanker and airlift fleet, follows closely. Germany's large Typhoon fleet is potent but is penalized by its reliance on older Tornado aircraft and shared tanker assets. The Netherlands and Belgium show the impact of F-35 acquisition, which significantly boosts their scores relative to their size.

Conclusion

The quantitative COFM assessment provides an objective foundation for understanding the military balance in a self-reliant Western Europe. The numbers themselves, when contextualized within the post-American strategic framework, reveal the underlying structure of power, influence, and dependency.

The Triumvirate of Power: UK, France, and Germany

The aggregate scores clearly indicate that the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are the dominant military powers, collectively possessing over 85% of the total combat potential of the group. However, the nature of their power is fundamentally different, creating a complementary but potentially fractious triumvirate.

• Germany is the indispensable land power. Its heavy armored divisions provide the mass necessary to deter or defeat a large-scale conventional ground invasion in Central Europe. Any credible European defense of NATO's eastern flank would be structurally dependent on the German Army as its backbone.
• The United Kingdom is the preeminent maritime and 5th-generation air power. Its two-carrier navy, advanced submarine fleet, and F-35 force give it unparalleled capability in the North Atlantic and the ability to establish sea and air control in support of continental operations.
• France represents the most balanced expeditionary power. With a nuclear-powered carrier, a modern and deployable land force, a fully sovereign air combat system, and an independent nuclear deterrent, France is the most strategically complete actor, capable of projecting power across all domains.

The Benelux Role: Specialized Enablers

The Netherlands and Belgium, while fielding modern and well-equipped forces, have combat potential scores that are significantly lower than the "big three." The data suggests their most effective role is not as independent strategic actors but as providers of high-end, specialized capabilities that integrate into a larger coalition. The Dutch, with their advanced air defense frigates, upgraded CV90s, and F-35 fleet, are a potent force multiplier for a German-led land defense or a UK-led maritime task group. Belgium's expertise in mine countermeasures and its adoption of French SCORPION vehicles position it as a key partner for littoral operations and medium-weight land formations.

Key Strategic Dependencies Revealed by COFM

The COFM scores illuminate the critical interdependencies that would define a European security architecture without the United States as the ultimate guarantor and enabler.

• Continental Reliance on Maritime Power: Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium lack the ability to independently project and sustain significant air power over maritime domains. They would be reliant on the aircraft carriers of the UK and France to secure sea lanes, support amphibious operations, or conduct strikes from the sea.
• Maritime Reliance on Land Power: Conversely, the UK's land forces are too small to sustain a major continental conflict independently. In a scenario requiring the deployment of forces to mainland Europe, the UK would provide critical air and sea support but would depend on the mass of the German Army and the expeditionary capabilities of the French Army.

The Enabler Deficit: The reliance of Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium on the pooled NATO MMF tanker fleet is a significant vulnerability. In a crisis where national priorities diverge, access to these shared assets could be constrained, severely limiting the operational range and effectiveness of their otherwise advanced air forces. The UK and France, with their large sovereign tanker fleets, do not share this vulnerability.

This research does not take into account qualitative factors like the state of readiness and assumes that the inventories of all assessed nations are fully operational. In the future, qualitative analysis should be performed, using the method of Net Assessment (Cohen, 1990), in order to gain a proper understanding of qualitative factors as well as long term trends and developments on the European continent.