Venezuela: A Force Posture Analysis

Abstract: This analysis, using the Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) methodology, finds Venezuela poses a coercive, not an invasion, threat to the Dutch ABC islands. Its amphibious capability is severely degraded, contrasting sharply with its formidable standoff strike and A2/AD missile systems. A direct invasion is therefore a high-risk, low-probability scenario. The primary threat is coercion, where Venezuela could use its potent A2/AD forces to isolate the islands and deter intervention.

Introduction

Recent escalations in tensions, particularly US' posturing and Venezuelan rhetoric concerning the disputed Essequibo region, have heightened security concerns across the wider Caribbean. For the Kingdom of the Netherlands, this regional instability presents a direct national security challenge, focusing attention on the vulnerability of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao (the ABC islands). Situated a stone's throw from the Venezuelan coast, these islands exist within the immediate strategic reach of the Bolivarian Armed Forces. Consequently, a critical question emerges for Dutch defense planners: What is the true nature and extent of the military threat posed by Venezuela to the Dutch Caribbean?

A superficial glance at Venezuela's military inventory can be misleading. While the nation struggles under a prolonged economic crisis that has hollowed out many of its conventional forces, it has also selectively invested in modern, asymmetric capabilities. Simple comparisons of troop numbers or naval tonnage fail to capture this complex reality of decay and modernization. This paper seeks to provide a more nuanced and data-driven assessment. It moves beyond a "bean count" to analyze whether Venezuela possesses the requisite components for a successful amphibious invasion and, perhaps more importantly, what other military options it could employ to coerce or threaten the islands.

This analysis argues that while a conventional, opposed amphibious invasion of the ABC islands is an exceedingly unlikely and militarily unsound scenario for Venezuela, the nation has cultivated a potent Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability. This posture, built around a layered arsenal of advanced air- and land-based anti-ship missiles and supported by capable strike aircraft, poses the most credible and immediate threat. This study will demonstrate that Venezuela's force structure is not optimized for conquest, but rather for coercion—to deter foreign intervention, control its maritime approaches, and hold high-value regional targets at risk from a standoff distance. By applying a formal analytical framework, this paper will quantify this strategic imbalance and outline the specific implications for the defense of the Dutch Caribbean.

Methodology

To provide a structured and data-driven assessment, this paper utilizes the Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) framework. COFM is a formal analytical methodology, with origins in Soviet military science, that has been adapted and employed by various modern militaries, including the United States Army, to compare the relative combat power of opposing forces and estimate potential engagement outcomes. It offers a systematic approach to move beyond simple quantitative comparisons of troops and equipment, incorporating both tangible and intangible factors of military strength (RAND, 2020).

The Concept of Combat Potential (CP)

At the core of the COFM methodology is the concept of Combat Potential (CP). CP is a numerical index assigned to a weapon system or military unit that reflects its aggregated lethality, effectiveness, and overall contribution to a military operation. A common application of COFM involves establishing a "reference asset" for a particular class of equipment (e.g., a main battle tank) and assigning it a CP value of 1.0. Other systems in that class are then scored relative to this baseline; a more advanced tank might receive a CP of 1.2, while an older model might be valued at 0.7.

However, as this analysis compares disparate systems across different military domains (naval, air, and land-based missile systems), a single reference asset is impractical. Therefore, this paper employs an adapted methodology using absolute CP values. These values are derived from a consistent evaluation of key performance parameters, allowing for a direct comparison of, for example, the combat potential of a fighter squadron versus an amphibious task force. The fundamental calculation remains the same: multiplying the number of available systems by a pre-determined CP value for that specific system, a method similar to that used by institutions like the U.S. Army's TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). This creates a standardized metric for assessing the overall balance of forces (Spurlin et al.).

Assigning CP Values: The Fusion of Quantitative Data and Expert Judgment

The assignment of CP values in this analysis is a multi-step process that fuses objective data with expert military judgment. Baseline CP values are derived from the tangible performance characteristics of each weapon system. These characteristics include:

• Lethality: Warhead size, type (e.g., semi-armor-piercing), and destructive power.
• Range and Speed: The standoff distance at which a system can engage a target and the velocity of its munitions. Supersonic, sea-skimming missiles, for example, receive a higher CP value than subsonic ones due to the drastically reduced reaction time they afford a defender.
• Guidance and Accuracy: The sophistication of the guidance system (e.g., inertial navigation, active radar homing, resistance to electronic countermeasures) and its probability of hitting the intended target.
• Platform Survivability: The defensive capabilities and stealth characteristics of the launch platform (e.g., a fast, small-signature missile boat versus a large, slow landing ship).

Technical specifications for these parameters are drawn from open-source intelligence and defense industry data for each Venezuelan asset.

The Critical Role of Qualitative Multipliers

A key tenet of COFM is that a simple "bean count" of weapon systems is insufficient for a realistic assessment. Combat power is profoundly affected by intangible factors that determine whether a system's theoretical potential can be realized in practice. Therefore, the baseline CP values are adjusted using qualitative multipliers to reflect the current reality of the Venezuelan armed forces. The primary multipliers applied in this paper are:  

• Operational Readiness: This reflects the actual material condition, maintenance status, and availability of a given asset. This is a critical variable for Venezuela, where economic hardship has severely impacted the upkeep of complex legacy systems, even as recent tensions have spurred exercises and a buildup of select forces. 
• Crew Proficiency and Training: This accounts for the skill, experience, and training level of the personnel operating the equipment. The effectiveness of a sophisticated platform like an Su-30MK2 fighter is directly proportional to the quality of its pilot and ground crew. Incidents such as the sinking of a Venezuelan patrol boat after it rammed a cruise ship suggest potential deficiencies in this area (Rogoway et al., 2020). 
• System Integration: This considers the ability to employ assets as part of a coherent, networked force rather than as individual platforms.

This process of assigning and adjusting CP values is more than a technical calculation; it reveals the strategic priorities of a nation. Venezuela's demonstrable willingness to invest in the readiness of new, asymmetric systems like Iranian-sourced missile boats while allowing its capital-intensive frigates to fall into disrepair is a clear strategic choice (Sutton, 2023). This choice, forced by a severe economic crisis that precludes the maintenance of expensive Western hardware, has resulted in a deliberate pivot away from a traditional blue-water naval doctrine towards one focused on A2/AD. The final CP scores, therefore, not only measure capability but also quantitatively illustrate this fundamental shift in Venezuelan military strategy.

Analysis of Venezuela's Naval Invasion Capabilities

This section provides a granular assessment of the platforms and assets the Bolivarian Navy of Venezuela could employ for an amphibious assault. The analysis focuses on the actual, versus nominal, capabilities of these forces, factoring in readiness and operational context. The reference asset used in this analysis is the Guaiquerí-class patrol vessel.

Amphibious Lift Platforms: The Capana-Class LSTs

The foundation of Venezuela's amphibious lift capability rests with its four Capana-class Landing Ships, Tank (LSTs). These vessels, built in South Korea in the 1980s, are based on older American LST designs and represent a dated approach to amphibious warfare. Each ship is designed to carry approximately 200 troops and up to 690 tons of cargo, which can include a combination of main battle tanks, such as the T-72B1, and amphibious armored personnel carriers.

Despite their capacity, the Capana-class ships are slow, with a maximum speed of just 15 knots, and are very lightly armed, typically with 40mm and 20mm autocannons for self-defense (Daegel). Their operational readiness is a significant concern, reflecting the broader maintenance challenges facing the Venezuelan Navy. In any contested environment, these large, slow-moving vessels would be exceptionally vulnerable to attack from modern anti-ship missiles, submarines, or combat aircraft. Given their slow speed, minimal self-defense armament, and high vulnerability, each operational Capana-class LST is assigned a low Combat Potential of 0.5 CP. Their value is almost entirely in their cargo capacity, not their combat effectiveness.

Naval Escort and Fire Support: A Hollowed-Out Force

A successful amphibious operation requires robust naval escort and fire support, an area where Venezuela's capabilities have severely degraded.

• Mariscal Sucre (Lupo)-Class Frigates: Nominally, Venezuela's two Italian-built Lupo-class frigates are its most powerful surface combatants. They are designed to carry a potent armament, including Otomat anti-ship missiles, Aspide surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), a 127mm naval gun, and anti-submarine torpedoes. However, multiple credible reports indicate that both frigates have been largely non-operational for years due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts. On paper, a fully operational Lupo-class frigate, with its array of missiles and guns, would possess a CP of over 5.0. However, given their confirmed non-operational status, their effective Combat Potential is 0 CP for any near-term scenario (Milpower).
• Guaiquerí (Avante 2200)-Class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs): The more modern component of the surface fleet consists of three Spanish-built Guaiquerí-class OPVs. These vessels are armed with a 76mm Oto Melara main gun and a 35mm Oerlikon Millennium close-in weapon system (CIWS), making them effective for maritime patrol and limited naval gunfire support against lightly defended shore targets (Van Lokeren, 2025). While there has been considerable speculation about retrofitting these ships with Chinese C-802A anti-ship missiles, concrete confirmation of their full operational integration across the class is lacking. As a modern patrol platform with a capable 76mm gun and advanced sensors, but lacking an integrated anti-ship missile system, the Guaiquerí-class OPV is assigned a Combat Potential of 1.0 CP. This reflects its utility in naval gunfire support and escort roles but acknowledges its limited offensive power against other warships.
• Guaicamacuto (Avante 1400)-Class Littoral Surveillance Ships (BVL): Three smaller Guaicamacuto-class patrol vessels, similarly armed with a 76mm gun and a 35mm CIWS, supplement the OPV fleet. Designed for coastal duties, they would serve in a secondary escort or screening role (Naval Technology, 2012). The credibility of this force is undermined by the 2020 loss of the ANBV Naiguatá (GC-23), a vessel of this class, which sank after ramming an ice-strengthened civilian cruise ship—an incident that raises serious questions about the professionalism and training of Venezuelan naval crews. Slightly smaller and less capable than the OPVs, and with a history that raises questions about crew proficiency, the Guaicamacuto-class BVL is assigned a Combat Potential of 0.75 CP.

Asymmetric Naval Threats: The Peykaap-III (Zolfaghar) Fast Attack Craft

The most significant recent development in Venezuela's naval inventory is the acquisition of at least four, and possibly as many as seven, Iranian-designed Peykaap-III (also known as Zolfaghar) class fast attack craft (FAC). These vessels are small, fast, and possess a low radar cross-section, based on a North Korean design optimized for littoral combat. With a top speed of over 50 knots, they are armed with two anti-ship missiles—identified as the Iranian CM-90 (Nasir), which has a range of 90 km (Carlson, 2021).

The doctrine associated with these craft emphasizes "swarm" tactics, using high speed and small numbers to overwhelm a defender's sensors and defensive systems. Their recent and very public forward deployment to bases at Guiria and Punta Barima, near the disputed Essequibo region, highlights their central role in Venezuela's evolving maritime strategy (Berg et al., 2024). Combining high speed (>50 knots), a low radar cross-section, and a modern 90-km range missile system, the Peykaap-III represents a potent asymmetric threat. Each craft is assigned a Combat Potential of 1.50 CP, a high value for its small size, reflecting its disproportionate ability to inflict damage.

This combination of decaying conventional forces and modernizing asymmetric assets presents a clear paradox. The economic collapse has made it impossible for Venezuela to maintain its complex, Western-built frigates, the traditional backbone of a sea-control navy. This has forced a strategic pivot towards a doctrine of sea denial, leveraging cheaper, lower-maintenance platforms acquired from alternative partners like Iran. The implication is profound: Venezuela is no longer structured to execute a classic, contested amphibious landing. Its naval posture is now optimized for coercion and for dramatically increasing the risks of intervention within its immediate coastal and maritime zone. An assault on the ABC islands would therefore be an extremely high-risk operation, heavily dependent on achieving total strategic surprise, as the invasion force itself would be fragile and inadequately protected by conventional naval standards.

Assessment of Venezuelan Standoff Strike and Area Denial Capabilities

This section evaluates the missile systems that constitute the most potent and credible element of Venezuela's military power. These assets provide the capacity to project lethal force from significant distances, establishing a formidable A2/AD bubble and holding high-value naval and land targets at risk.

Air-Launched Anti-Ship Capabilities: The Su-30MK2 & Kh-31A

Venezuela's premier offensive strike capability resides in its fleet of approximately 22 operational Sukhoi Su-30MK2 multirole fighter aircraft (GFP, 2025). Despite some attrition from crashes and potential maintenance challenges, these remain among the most advanced combat aircraft in Latin America, characterized by long range, heavy payload, and advanced avionics. The primary anti-ship munition for this platform is the Russian-made Kh-31A (NATO: AS-17 "Krypton") air-to-surface missile (Airforce Technology, 2016). The Kh-31A is a ramjet-powered, supersonic sea-skimming missile that can achieve speeds in excess of Mach 3.5 and has a range of up to 70 km. Its extreme speed makes it exceptionally difficult for conventional shipboard air defense systems to intercept. As the most advanced and flexible strike platform in the inventory, capable of delivering the supersonic Kh-31A missile, each operational Su-30MK2 is assigned a very high Combat Potential of 2.50 CP. This value reflects its combination of range, payload, advanced avionics, and the lethality of its primary anti-ship munition.

Coastal Defense Systems: The Bal-E Mobile Battery

To defend its extensive coastline and control maritime approaches, Venezuela operates the Russian Bal-E (NATO: SSC-6 "Sennight") mobile coastal defense missile system (NavalToday, 2012). A typical battery is comprised of command vehicles, launchers, and transloaders, all mounted on highly mobile MZKT-7930 8x8 truck chassis, allowing for rapid deployment and concealment. The system fires the Kh-35 "Uran" (NATO: SS-N-25 "Switchblade") anti-ship missile, a subsonic, sea-skimming weapon with a range of approximately 130 km (WeaponSystems). Each launch vehicle carries eight missiles, enabling the system to fire large salvos. The CP for the Bal-E system is calculated per launcher vehicle, which carries a full complement of eight Kh-35 missiles. The ability to fire a large salvo, combined with the system's high mobility, makes it a powerful area denial tool. Each launcher vehicle is assigned a Combat Potential of 8.0 CP.

Ship-Launched Anti-Ship Missiles: A Diverse but Uneven Arsenal

Venezuela's ship-launched missile inventory reflects its strategic transition:

• Otomat Mk 2: This long-range (180 km) Italian missile is a potent weapon on paper, but its operational status is entirely dependent on the non-operational Mariscal Sucre-class frigates that serve as its launch platform.
• C-802A: There is strong evidence that Venezuela has acquired this 180-km range Chinese missile for its Guaiquerí-class OPVs. Successful integration would significantly upgrade the offensive capability of its patrol fleet, but confirmation of widespread, operational deployment remains unclear.
• CM-90 (Nasir): This 90-km range Iranian missile is the primary armament of the new Peykaap-III FACs. Its confirmed acquisition and deployment on a modern, operational platform makes it the most credible ship-launched threat in Venezuela's current inventory.

Layered Air Defense: Protecting Offensive Assets

Venezuela's offensive capabilities are enabled by a layered and largely mobile Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). This includes long-range S-300VM systems (of questionable readiness), highly capable medium-range Buk-M2E systems, and modernized short-range S-125 Pechora-2M batteries. At the lowest tier, a large inventory of advanced SA-24 (Igla-S) MANPADS provides point defense for ground forces and critical infrastructure. As a highly capable, mobile, medium-range air defense system crucial for protecting high-value assets like airbases and coastal missile batteries, each operational Buk-M2E launcher is assigned a significant Combat Potential of 4.0 CP. While individually less powerful, the sheer number and portability of the SA-24 MANPADS create a dense, low-altitude air defense umbrella. Each system is assigned a Combat Potential of 0.15 CP, reflecting its point-defense role.

The specific composition of this missile arsenal points to a coherent strategy of coercive deterrence. The Kh-31 provides a rapid, high-end strike capability against priority naval targets. The Bal-E creates a persistent, mobile coastal defense shield. The Peykaap-III with its CM-90s offers a flexible, littoral swarm threat. This is not the arsenal of a force designed for sustained, expeditionary warfare. It is a toolkit designed to counter a technologically superior adversary by maximizing risk and uncertainty for any force intervening in its sphere of influence.

Quantitative COFM Analysis and Combat Potential Scoring

This section synthesizes the preceding qualitative assessment into the quantitative COFM framework. The CP scores are based on the methodology outlined earlier, incorporating both the baseline technical capabilities of the systems and critical multipliers for operational readiness and proficiency.

CP Assignment and Justification

The CP values assigned in this paper are derived from the detailed analysis in the preceding sections. Key systems are valued based on their direct contribution to the specified mission scenario. For example, the Su-30MK2 fighter is valued highly due to its speed, range, and carriage of the supersonic Kh-31 missile. The Peykaap-III FAC receives a high score its speed and modern missiles create a disproportionate threat. Conversely, the Capana-class LST is assigned a low value, reflecting its vulnerability and role as a transport rather than a combatant. Air defense systems like the Buk-M2E are also assigned significant CP values, not for their offensive power, but for their critical enabling role in an A2/AD scenario. The readiness of each system is a critical multiplier; for instance, the powerful Mariscal Sucre-class frigates are assigned an operational CP of zero due to their non-operational state.

Final Report Table: Correlation of Forces and Means for Venezuelan Offensive Capabilities

The table below presents the final COFM analysis for Venezuelan forces relevant to the specified scenario. "Quantity (Operational Estimate)" reflects the number of assets likely to be available and mission-capable for a near-term operation, based on readiness assessments. "Assigned CP (Per Unit)" is the combat potential value assigned to each individual asset, accounting for both its inherent capabilities and readiness multipliers.

Conclusion and Strategic Implications

The quantitative Correlation of Forces and Means analysis reveals a Venezuelan military that is highly specialized and imbalanced. The final scores—a meager 13.5 CP for its Naval Invasion Force versus a formidable 110.5 CP for its Strike & Area Denial Force—are not merely numerical abstractions; they represent a fundamental reality of Venezuela's strategic posture.

Based on this analysis, a direct, contested amphibious assault against Aruba, Curaçao, or Bonaire would be a military operation fraught with extreme risk for Venezuela. The limited number and high vulnerability of its amphibious lift assets, coupled with the poor state of its conventional naval escort forces, would make it exceedingly difficult to establish and sustain a beachhead in the face of organized resistance or third-party intervention. The low CP score of the invasion force accurately reflects its low probability of success in a conventional military confrontation.

The true threat posed by Venezuela in a Caribbean contingency lies not in its capacity for invasion, but in its demonstrated ability to conduct coercive diplomacy backed by credible military force. The high CP score of its missile forces illustrates a potent capability to isolate the islands, deter or defeat a naval intervention, and inflict significant damage from a standoff distance. A more likely Venezuelan course of action would not be an immediate landing, but rather the establishment of an A2/AD zone around the islands. This could be achieved by deploying Bal-E coastal defense batteries to the Paraguaná Peninsula, conducting armed Su-30MK2 patrols with Kh-31 missiles, and using Peykaap-III fast attack craft to enforce a maritime exclusion zone. Such a move would constitute a de facto blockade, creating an international crisis and pressuring regional actors to negotiate under the threat of sudden and severe escalation.

In conclusion, Venezuela has rationally adapted to its prolonged economic crisis and shifting geopolitical alignments. It has divested from a decaying, maintenance-intensive conventional force structure and reinvested in a potent, modern, and asymmetric A2/AD capability. While this posture is primarily designed for regime defense and deterrence, it provides the Venezuelan government with powerful and flexible offensive tools for coercion and brinkmanship in its near-abroad. The threat to the ABC islands, therefore, should be measured not by the number of marines Venezuela can land on a beach, but by its capacity to inflict sudden, politically impactful damage with a diverse and lethal arsenal of standoff missile systems.